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xplosive hazard (EH) clearance comes at a cost and, logically,

EXTENT. Despite the progress made in removing EH from areas

with accountability expected as a quid pro quo both for those

liberated from ISIS after 2017,4 Iraq still remains one of the world’s

conducting and those funding clearance activities.1

most contaminated countries by area 5,6,7 based on its more than 2,500

Today’s accountability problem arguably begins with the recogni-

square kilometers of contaminated land. To place this in perspective,

tion that EH clearance, particularly in complex environments contam-

the International Campaign to Ban Landmines classifies contamina-

inated with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), differs radically from

tion in excess of 100 square kilometers as “massive.”8 Add on to this

conventional mine action operations of the past, introducing various

estimate the fact that an estimated 130,000 residential homes in liber-

new factors that influence costs and cost-effectiveness. This, in turn,

ated areas are reported as damaged or destroyed,9 and many of these

begs two questions: “What factors?” and “How are they measured?”

are assessed as likely to contain explosive remnants of war (ERW) or

Hence, before the mine action community can evaluate cost-

IEDs and the true scale of the problem is immense.10 Further, the over-

effectiveness leading to accountability, it must first re-conceptualize

all impact of the level of EH contamination across all economic sectors

clearance itself based on well-documented, current clearance opera-

has yet to be measured. For example, in Ninewa Governate alone, of

tions such as derived from the UNMAS experience in Iraq.

a total of 100 confirmed and suspected hazardous areas (SHA) iden-

Traditional metrics for the measurement of EH generally utilize the

tified in al-Hamdaniya, Baashiqa, and Tilkaif districts, the majority

relationship between square meters of land cleared and items of EH

of SHAs were located in agricultural areas.11 As of 2019, agricultural

removed/rendered safe in the process, irrespective of other factors. The

capacity, the second most important sector of the Iraqi economy after

exclusion of these other factors understates both the complexity of the

oil, remains down 40 percent from pre-ISIS levels.12

clearance problem itself as well as the associated factors that drive costs.

ENVIRONMENT. Within Iraq’s recorded contaminated areas,

This article looks at additional factors, suggesting how the sector might

two types of environments bracket the clearance landscape extremes.

determine their relative value in the scheme of EH clearance costs.

The first concerns the comparatively simple rural environment defined

FACTORS. Based on experience in Iraq, clearance arguably is a

by predictability and consistency. These can comprise IEDs of similar

function of six factors, each contributing to a cost matrix: (1) events

design laid in linear patterns with even spacing to defend a position

leading to contamination; (2) extent of contamination; (3) environ-

from an assault, either surface or sub-surface, in open land typically

ment type; (4) exposure of operators based on device and/or its design;

visible to the naked eye, easily detected with standard gear, and often

(5) experience such as skills and assets appropriate for clearance and

free from unexploded ordnance (UXO), other battle debris, and scrap

safe removal of threats as assessed; and, given that ISIS elements con-

metal.13 Conversely, the second involves the highly-complex urban

tinue to engage in asymmetric attacks on both civilians and security

environment defined by ingenuity and random occurrence. Complex

forces throughout Iraq’s so-called liberated areas, (6) disruption that

environments include a diverse range of IEDs of varied and innovative

adds delay to the cost of operations. The common denominator across

designs, well-concealed with a vertical dimension added, combined

the matrix is the contribution of each factor to time-on-task for those

with high concentrations of UXO, often mixed with debris and within

clearance assets deployed.

collapsed buildings that limit access and maneuverability.14

EVENTS. Given that the mix, amount, location, and concentra-

EXPOSURE. As with the two types of environments, hazards

tion of EH in contaminated areas correspond with conflict phases,

removed and rendered safe in each suggest comparatively low and high

“informed” non-technical surveys (iNTS) as currently conducted

exposure threat levels for operators based on factors such as device type,

by UNMAS Iraq effectively “look back in time” to data collected on

design, condition, amount, as well as potential biological and chemical

design, manufacture, and deployment of weapons consistent with con-

hazards. In simple environments, variants of a single type of crudely

ventional and non-conventional combat tactics, and documentation of

but effectively designed, victim-operated IED (VOIED) predominate,

hostilities, concluding with the present, on-going insurgency.2,3 With

making clearance repetitive. These VOIEDs consist of a 6-10 kg main

this in-depth study of the pre-, event, and post-event phases of con-

charge connected by a detonating cord to one or more high-metal pres-

flict as a guide, UNMAS Iraq works toward an initial “best estimate”

sure plates, and are occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices, a 9-volt

of threat environments by preparing for clearance tasks and required

battery, and a commercially manufactured electrical detonator.15 This

skill sets and mechanical assets.

simple environment reduces the exposure threat to a comparatively

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

A Local National Search team clears empty .50 caliber cartridge cases from an area inside the al-Shifa Hospital Complex in West Mosul. This is a ‘Complex 3 Dimensional
Urban Environment.’ Even simple activities like this require a high level of training and oversight to ensure safe conduct and delivery.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.

low level. Conversely, in complex environments, multiple variants of

include air-dropped munitions filled with ammonium nitrate-based

sophisticated, time-, victim-, and command-operated IEDs differ not

explosives, modified 23 mm high-explosive incendiary projectiles for

only by type of initiation but by their design, components, layout, fab-

use as hand thrown and drone dropped weapons, and rockets impro-

rication, charge size, and delivery method, making clearance a bespoke

vised and fitted with chemical warheads sometimes containing low-

task, thereby raising the exposure threat to a high level.

grade mustard gas.18

For example, variants of command-operated IEDs (COIED) can

EXPERIENCE. In response to conditions in Iraq, UNMAS

include both wire and remote-controlled systems, the latter typically

reconstituted its clearance teams into light and heavy versions. Light,

integrating modified, low-cost mobile telephones as arming mecha-

nationally staffed teams are small, highly mobile, lightly-equipped,

nisms, including some with passive infrared (PIR) technology. In one

self-supported, and specialize in spot tasks, and high-risk search

instance, a variant included as many as twenty-two 9-volt batteries

and disposal conducted to international and UN IEDD standards,

to extend the IED’s “life.”16 Other victim-operated designs use nearly

capable of deploying anywhere in the country within 24 hours notice

invisible fishing twine as a trip wire connected to a syringe or toggle

and remaining on site, self-contained for 48 hours, supported by a

switch functioning as triggering devices to close circuits after force is

geographic information system (GIS) and telephone link to off-site

applied. These switches often indiscriminately target, but some anec-

international staff. Heavy teams are area-focused, traditionally larger,

dotal evidence suggests a clear intent on the part of ISIS to target explo-

usually equipped with mechanical assets but have reduced dependence

sive ordnance disposal (EOD) and IED disposal (IEDD) personnel

on international staff. This “new business model” focuses on skill

conducting clearance operations through their placement in the prox-

set development, increased reliance on national staff, and leveraging

imity of other, often more obvious, EH. In addition, the threat level in

international staff as knowledge “multipliers” to maintain standards

complex environments is elevated due to exposure to deceased victims

and reduce costs.19

wearing suicide belts still buried by the hundreds in urban debris, posing biologic as well as explosive threats.17

ELEMENTS. Given that known or suspected contaminated areas
are, by definition, inaccessible until cleared, they remain, de facto,

Concentrations of conventional UXO in both environments

part of an effective ISIS “de-stabilization” strategy, 20 posing a con-

obviously map to the intensity and progression of the fighting and

stant threat to disrupt clearance operations, contaminate new areas,

tactics used by both sides. Conventional UXO threats include ISIS-

and to re-contaminate areas already cleared. Recovery delays work to

manufactured mortars, rockets, projectiles, and grenades comparable

ISIS advantage by perpetuating economic hardship, political unrest,

in quality to ordnance used by coalition forces. Enhanced UXO threats

social strife, and individual anxiety. In one recent, typical month, one
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MEASUREMENT. Traditional measurement of humanitarian mine action (HMA) focuses nearly exclusively on extent
as a factor (i.e., square meters of land physically cleared), with
additional metrics such as the amount, location, and concentration of EH removed/rendered safe in the process routinely
used to supplement report.28 However, this like-for-like comparison between contaminated areas fails to account for those
other factors that contribute to time-on-task: environment
type, exposure of operators to threats by device type and/or
its design, skills, and assets appropriate for clearance and safe
removal of threats as assessed, and security as a function of ISIS
element activity. How then to evaluate cost-effective, efficient,
safe, and timely clearance for Iraq’s varying threat conditions
and complexities?
INDEX. Logically, the more hazardous the EH task, the
more time required for safe clearance, removal, and disposal of
hazards. Hence, the need to calculate the relative “hazardousness” or the potential for a task to cause death, serious harm,

Figure 1. Number of incidents by governorate according to month.
Figure courtesy of Carol Cleary, based on UNDSS data, 1 January - 15 April 2020,
inclusive.
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missions as a direct consequence of “day of ” security reassessments
or authorities’ denial of access to sites attributable to potential ISIS
threats in its areas of operations, thereby adding to overall costs.21
As of early 2020, intelligence agencies see incident trends increasing
(see Figure 1) in the governorates comprising the “disputed areas.” For
example, Ninewa and Salah al-Din show slight decreases for the first fifteen days of April 2020 when compared with the first quarter monthly
averages, while other governorates show an increase. As of January
2020, various intelligence services estimate ISIS strength increasing
over the past 12 months ranging from a low of 5,00022,23 to 10,000 split
between field and sleeper cell elements, 24 to a high of 18,000, 25 highly
concentrated in the so-called liberated or disputed areas (see Figure
2 and Figure 3).26 ISIS’s own data from Nada, the ISIS digital weekly
report, typically trend lower than open-source compilations released
by intelligence and government agencies;27 clearly, contaminated areas
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compiled for Iraq’s environmental conditions and technical
complexity. Variables impinge upon cost-effective, safe, and
timely EH clearance conducted to IMAS standards. If reliable, such data, when analyzed and indexed, can aid decision
making relating to clearance team composition, structure,
training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately
trained for each task) with a net gain of increased team efficiency, team member protection, and better value for money
for the donor.
DATA. To develop its lethality index, 29 UNMAS began
with clearance data from two IED areas: (1) more than 500
IED clearance tasks in Fallujah and environs, indicative of a

of three UNMAS clearance teams deployed had to abort 66 percent of

40

atic measurement of evidence-based threat data, in this case

20 * 36 = 720

Table 1.
All tables courtesy of the author.

work to their advantage as they wage a “war of attrition.”

or damage. Calculating this lethality starts with the system-

simple environment 30 and (2) more than 1,000 IED clearance
tasks in Mosul, indicative of a complex environment, and then

added both the concept of (3) two-dimensional and three-dimensional
search; and then, finally, (4) definitions of urban and rural landscapes
from census methodologies. 31 Through this combination and permutation of the various derived environmental and technical factors (see
Table 2), UNMAS could assign scores consistently for IED locations as
indicated along with their lethality index scoring.
UNMAS next evaluated IEDs recovered in Iraq for impact of their
technical complexities on actual render safe procedures. Scores are
either evidence-based or assessed depending upon whether the lethality index is being used as a predictive or descriptive tool.
PHASES. As stated, time-on-task is a function of clearance conditions and these are directly related to lethality. Based on historical
data for Iraq, the “more lethal” tasks tend to take priority because, in a
post-event environment, clearance of urban sites (which are followed
by rural sites) directly leads to stabilization, reconstruction, and development. 32 While this gives a useful indication of the progression of
likely task types as time progresses in such post-event environments,
it does not describe the actual clearance achieved through those transitioning time periods.

activities in urban areas prioritized;
(2) more open and rural areas often
based on incomplete or inaccurate
hazard data; and (3) open and rural
areas based on a more up-to-date
and accurate hazard database with
the following observations related
to impact of time on clearance: 33
In phase 1, thorough iNTS reports
had already confirmed the presence
of EH prior to teams’ deployment to
task locations. Due to the condition
of many of these sites, including the
presence of collapsed buildings and
rubble, a requirement to use highrisk search teams meant that areas
cleared were relatively small, though
the quantities of EH recovered were
relatively high.
In phases 2 and 3, a shift to more
rural areas saw a rapidly increasing
area of land cleared with an accompanying decrease in items of EH recovered. This again raises the issue of
whether area cleared is an indicator
of efficiency when the data to the contrary indicates clearance environment

Figure 2. ISIL Operational Sectors in Iraq.
Figure courtesy of United Nations Joint Analysis Unit, Iraq.

and complexity as likely drivers. 34
Over time, as the main focus of
clearance activities transitions from
complex urban environments to rural
simple environments and the concentration of contamination decreases,
larger areas searched yield fewer IEDs
rendered safe, suggesting a different set of parameters influences the
devices present. This may specifically
relate to tactical requirements at different stages of hostilities, including
whether used for offense or defense.
Particularly notable when used as a
predictor for the lethality index, data
compiled shows little-to-no evidence
of device degradation over time.
UTILITY. Accepting the evidence
presented thus far, the lethality index
arguably has utility both as a

Figure 3. UNMAS Data from IMSMA and SMART System for 2019.
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq Information Management Unit.

• Descriptor. Given detailed information for a specific clearance

UNMAS analyzed field data for square meters searched as a

location (for example through iNTS reports or previous clearance

function of time to locate and render safe/remove EH for three

activities), the index can generate an evidence-based metric as a

phases of clearance task types: (1) heavily contaminated sites,

basis to manage safety and efficiency by ensuring the most appro-

largely in populated areas and often in support of stabilization

priate assets for the task.
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An improvised directional main charge in al-Shifa Hospital, West Mosul. Similar items were found daisy chained together with detonating cord and connected to victimoperated switches. These types of devices with variable and complex emplacements are typical of ‘Complex 3 Dimensional Urban’ environments.
Image courtesy of UNMAS.

• Predictor. In the preparation of future
Environmental Factors Description

clearance contracts, or prior to moving

Designation

clearance capabilities to new areas, the

Classification

Lethality Index Score

EH landscapes in Iraq may be characterized as:
Rural – Normally open, flat areas which may or may not be cultivated.
Normally free of large quantities of waste or foreign objects. Low
population density.
Urban – Normally developed areas, featuring high concentrations of
buildings, infrastructure and support services. Generally cluttered and
may contain large quantities of waste and/or foreign objects. High
population density.
EH environments in Iraq may be classified by dimension and technical
sophistication:
2-Dimensional (2-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across
surface and depth (sub-surface) planes.
3-Dimensional (3-D) – EH environments requiring clearance across
surface, depth (sub-surface), and vertical (walls) planes.
Simple – Consistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively easy
to detect; IEDs relatively simple in design in relation to render safe
procedures required. Consequences of accidental initiation during
render safe procedures are manageable.
Complex – Inconsistent IED placement, location, pattern, relatively
difficult to detect; IEDs relatively complex in design in relation to
render safe procedures. Consequences of accidental initiation during
render safe procedures are significant.
A number assigned to denote lethality relative to referent environmental factors, their influence on render safe procedures and associated risk. Scores range from 0 (no lethality) to 10 (extreme lethality).

Table 2.
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lethality index can give a metric to guide the
selection of the most appropriately trained,
structured, and equipped clearance team
based on the expected lethality of the task
location.
PRACTICALITY.

Whether used as a

descriptor or predictor, the lethality index is
computed the same way: the environmental
score is multiplied by the overall total for the
technical factors resulting in a highest possible
score of 720 to reflect the most complex combinations of environmental and technical factors, with a lowest score of thirty-five reflecting
the simplest possible combination of environmental and technical factors. The three following examples drawn from completed UNMAS
IED clearance tasks represent different environments and geographical locations, types,
and quantities of IEDs. A lethality index score
is given based upon a likely predictive score

(see Tables 4–6, predictive scores shown in

Classification

Lethality Index Score

Rural: Open uncultivated land

2-D, simple

1, 2 = 2

Rural: Open cultivated land

2-D, simple

1, 2 = 2

Rural: Open with isolated dwellings

2-D, complex

1, 4 = 4

Urban: Open space

2-D, complex

1, 8 = 8

Urban: Village

3-D, complex

2, 8 = 16

Urban: Fringe of town or city

3-D, complex

2, 8 = 16

Al-Shifa hospital was an ISIS headquar-

Urban: Town or City

3-D, complex

2, 10 = 20

ters, weapons store, and weapon manufac-

italics, shaded column, far right) prior to
the task commencing and a descriptive score
based on the physical evidence gathered during that task.
Example One: al-Shifa Hospital,
West Mosul

turing facility in West Mosul. Close to the
scene of some of the most violent fighting
4,762.49

during the battle to reclaim Mosul. UXO and
IED contamination was extensive, and device
complexity varied from simple to complex
throughout the site.
Example Two: al-Shuhada District,
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al-Maedan district, the hospital also was the
5,962.63

M2/EH Item

7,807.21

Table 3. * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.
8,302.42

Environmental Factor

Fallujah
ISIS made significant use of IED obstacle
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Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Figure 4. Square meters searched versus items of EH recovered between Jul 18 and Jun 19.
Figure courtesy of Nathan Williams, Operations Planning Officer, UNMAS Iraq.

belts around the city of Fallujah to defend
against the most likely directional advance
of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in any attempt
to retake the city. IEDs were laid in uniform patterns in many areas—including

Technical
Factor
Switch Type

Description
•
•
•

Design

Distribution

Clutter
Access

Ranges from
• Simple (single switch, single power source, simple main
charge) to
• Intermediate (simple plus anti-handling) to
• Complex (multiple switches, multiple main charges,
remoted power sources, complex anti-handling)

n/a
5

dling devices were located during clearance

Wire = 5
RC = 6
PIR = 10
Simple = 1
Intermediate = 5
Complex = 10

1
2

•

Location freely and easily accessible to search teams and
IED Operator. Clearance site simple to mark and access
control (civilian) is possible
Location congested, severely constrains search
planning and direction, access control is not possible.

1

Clear evidence of aging/weathering of the task location.
Devices likely in place in excess of 12 months
No evidence of aging/weathering of the task location.
Devices in place less than 12 months or may have been
protected

1

IED location obvious, often visible by eye, easily
confirmed with detector
IED location not apparent, not visible by eye, difficult to
locate with detectors

1

•

Table 4. * The index does not currently consider residential clearance activities.

Example Three: Rawa’h, West Anbar
A single suspected IED near a track previously used by ISF on security patrols was
successfully rendered safe after an UNMAS
search team located a suspicious wire. The IED

tional main charges. While the device type

Area free of metallic, other contamination
Area littered, including with metallic objects

•

(approximately 10 percent of total devices).

armed PIR switch connected to two direc-

•
•

•

dard device design. Occasional anti-han-

operator rendered safe a remote-controlled

1
2
3

•

Ease to
locate
Visual

al-Shuhada—almost always using a stan-

IEDs distribution/distributed
• Facilitates easy identification of components
• As part of a defensive belt
• Randomly across an area with no obvious pattern

•
Degradation

Time (not recovered as complete IED)
Victim Operated (most commonly High Metal
Content Pressure Plate)
Command (including wire, RC armed PIR) [for multiple IED,
use highest score]

Lethality Index
Score

3

3

5

was complex, the environment and other technical factors proved “less lethal” as reflected in
the cumulative Lethality Index Score.
Although useful as “stand-alone” metrics,
as cumulative scores paired with IMAS IEDD
skill levels (see Table 7), they become a useful tool to assist in assigning appropriately
trained IEDD operators based upon environmental and technical complexity.
MULTIPLIER. Given the trend in Iraq
toward employment of local national clearance capabilities as a cost-saving strategy, the
index serves as a multiplier by allowing for
assignment of locally staffed teams appropriate for tasks to work independently with the
option of technical oversight and referral via
a telephone thereby (1) leveraging limited
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8 * 12 = 96

Table 5.
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Index Score
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Index Score
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2 * 31 = 62

2 * 21 = 42

Table 6.
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Table 7.

international technical advisers on a task basis; and, longer term, (2)

such as IMAS IEDD skill levels and related costs, could offer the mine

reducing reliance on international advisors as local team expertise

action community a useful conceptual basis to continue to refine and

develops also on a task basis; and, (3) contributing to an earlier “phas-

develop meaningful and metric based tools that are able to respond to

ing out” of expensive international heavy clearance teams.

the fundamental donor question, “How much should clearance cost?”

BENEFITS. So what does the lethality index offer EH clearance
actors?
First, a clear basis for identifying appropriately trained and equipped
teams for clearance tasks.

for a given environment in a manner more reflective of the true range
of factors affecting clearance.
In response to return on investment, the mine action community in
Iraq still has a need for an economically derived baseline to measure

Second, a tool to identify cost savings early in the procurement

“opportunity cost,” or economic and social gains either conveyed or

cycle particularly related to clearance teams tailored for requirements

deferred as a function of clearance completed versus not completed.

as opposed to technical proposals often written by commercial com-

Arguably, this is the true value of clearance and a separate subject for

panies often based on large EH teams dominated by international

another time.

personnel and a less-than-transparent process sometimes viewed pri-

See endnotes page 70

vately as “less-than-educated guesswork.”
Third, support for the nationalization and development of local
clearance teams by rationalizing the process of training design, training delivery, on-the-job training, and continuing professional development, linking the transition of search and IEDD activities from taught
mechanistic drills to more intuitive skills.
CONCLUSION. Although the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) recognize the need for EH clearance as an
enabler of broader socioeconomic development, funding depends upon
strong arguments supported by data to respond to legitimate donor
concerns related to both value for money and return on investment.
In response to the value for money concern, UNMAS has evaluated
the IED threat in Iraq focusing on a composite measurement of those
environmental and technical factors affecting cost-effective, safe,
timely, optimized clearance done to IMAS standards while considering each as a variable contributing to overall task lethality as a lead
factor determining time-on-task and overall efficiency. Although not
a sine qua non, the lethality index, when coupled with other factors
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